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1  Introduction
Since the middle of the last century the prohibition on discrimination 
in general, and in employment in particular, has gained prominence. The 
initial recognition of protection against discrimination at international level 
through the adoption of a number of important conventions
2
 was followed 
by the irregular domestication of protection against discrimination across 
jurisdictions.
The development of employment discrimination law showed distinct 
phases and strands:
3
 An initial focus on direct discrimination based on 
unequal treatment and motive; a move away from the confines of treatment 
and motive to a focus on effect; the recognition of indirect discrimination; 
an impetus to expand the grounds of discrimination; a continuous struggle 
to conceptualise and circumscribe the acceptable limits of discrimination; 
the recognition of certain non-obvious policies and practices – notably 
harassment – as discrimination; the recognition of the difficulties associated 
with proof of discrimination cases followed by measures to tinker with 
the onus of proof; the development of the idea of substantive equality and 
increased recognition and application of affirmative action as an integral part 
of the pursuit of equality; and, finally, where enforcement of the right not to 
be discriminated against either paved the way, or proved to be an insufficient 
foundation, for the recognition of certain marginalised groups in society and 
a proper understanding of the prejudice associated with membership of those 
groups, the inclusion of specific rights in legislation to address that prejudice. 
Throughout this development, perhaps the central theme has been that 
discrimination as a legal concept is fraught and brings with it a number of 
1 
This article is the updated and final peer reviewed version of the authors’ presentation titled Employment 
Equity into the Future delivered at the ISLSSL Conference, Cape Town, September 2015 and the first 
author’s presentation titled The Impact of the EEA amendments delivered at the SASLAW Annual 
Conference, Johannesburg, July 2016, parts of which were previously published online by conference 
organisers in the form of a working paper.
2 
Noteworthy for present purposes are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 
1948) UNGA Res 217 (III) and, in the employment context, the International Labour Organisation’s C111 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention of 1958.
3 
See, in general, C Garbers “The prohibition of discrimination in employment: Performance and prognosis 
in a transformative context” in K Malherbe & J Sloth-Nielsen (eds) Labour Law into the Future: Essays 
in honour of D’Arcy du Toit Juta (2012) 18 ff.
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challenges. These challenges include uncertainty about the meaning of the 
concept itself, uncertainty about the limits of protection against discrimination, 
the difficulties in bringing a successful discrimination case to court, and the 
continued search for a sensible conceptual and practical articulation between 
a prohibition on discrimination and the idea of special measures or affirmative 
action. 
From the outset, these challenges were especially acute in the “new” 
South Africa. Prior to democracy, the organising principle of our society was 
discrimination, which excluded the majority of the population from effective 
and productive inclusion in the social, political and economic processes – 
including employment – that make up any individual and any society. After 
1994, the immediate societal demand for transformation meant that South 
Africa jumped, and had to jump, straight into the deep end of equality law. 
Equality was ensconced as a foundational value,
4
 an organising principle,
5
 
a substantive right,
6
 and an interpretive tool
7
 in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”). This was followed by the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (“EEA”) and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (“PEPUDA”) which aim 
to regulate equality in some detail in, respectively, employment and broader 
society. As far as the EEA is concerned, a comparison of its content with 
other jurisdictions is startling: section 6(1) prohibits unfair discrimination, 
both direct and indirect, on no less than 20 listed grounds (and this list is not 
exhaustive).
8
 From the outset the EEA declared that the onus to prove at least 
the fairness of discrimination rests on the employer.
9
 While not the focus of 
this article, the EEA also places a detailed obligation on designated employers
10
 
to implement affirmative action and, in so doing, shows clear choices as to 
who the beneficiaries of affirmative action may be,11 what measures need to 
be taken (inclusive of preferential promotion and appointment)
12
 and what 
the proxy or yardstick for past disadvantage and present success in addressing 
past discrimination is (“equitable representation” of these beneficiaries).13 
4 
Section 1(a) of the Constitution declares (among others) that 
“[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the …. values [of] … 
[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”
5 
Equality, dignity and freedom are the three overarching guiding principles in the Constitution – see, eg, 
sections 7, 36 and 39(1).
6 
S 9 of the Constitution. This section contains three substantive provisions – equality before the law 
(section 9(1)), affirmative action (section 9(2)) and protection against unfair discrimination (section 
9(3)-(5)).
7 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights” of which, as illustrated above, equality is one of the core principles.
8 
The listed grounds are race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political 
opinion, culture, language, birth. We count “social or ethnic origin” as two distinct grounds.
9 
Section 11 of the EEA provided (before the 2014 amendments) that “[w]henever unfair discrimination is 
alleged in terms of this Act, the employer against whom the allegation is made must establish that it is 
fair.”
10 
As defined in section 1. Chapter III of the EEA regulates the implementation of affirmative action.
11 
“Suitably qualified persons” (as defined in section 20(3)) from the “designated groups” (as defined in 
section 1).
12 
S 15.
13 
S 2.
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Thus, a pressing need to understand discrimination was immediately 
apparent; it continues to exist as a precondition for the concept to flourish in 
the South African context. And, it has to be said, this conceptual search was to 
some extent bedevilled by one simple reality: neither the Constitution nor the 
EEA tells us what “unfair discrimination” means. This raises a whole range of 
more specific issues that have been left to the courts. These are: The scope and 
meaning of the listed grounds of discrimination;
14
 the appropriate test for the 
recognition of so-called unlisted grounds; the question whether an appropriate 
comparator is always necessary in discrimination cases; the question as to 
how strong the link between an employment policy or practice and the alleged 
ground of discrimination should be; the test for indirect discrimination; 
whether there is such a thing as “fair” discrimination (as opposed to the idea 
of non-discrimination); whether the two listed grounds of “justification” in 
the EEA – an inherent requirement of a job and affirmative action – are the 
only two arguments available to employers to defeat discrimination claims or 
whether it is open to employers to argue fairness or justification as general 
concepts; whether the presence of these “justification” grounds means that 
there is no discrimination, means that there is “fair discrimination”, or means 
that otherwise unfair discrimination is justifiable; and, lastly, who bears the 
onus of proving what?
With this in mind, 2014 was an important year for South African 
employment discrimination law. First, we saw amendments to the EEA – 
notably, for present purposes, the inclusion of the phrase “or on any other 
arbitrary ground” in section 6(1), explicit provision for “equal pay” in sections 
6(4) and (5), a revamped onus provision in section 11 and changes to section 
10 to provide for jurisdiction of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration (“CCMA”) in most discrimination cases. Secondly, the 
introduction of sections 198B and 198C into the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 (“LRA”) may yet serve as a harbinger of things to come in the field of 
employment discrimination. These new sections (at least to the extent that 
they strive to provide for equality of treatment for fixed-term and part-time 
employees) raise questions about the continued role, and perhaps goal, of 
discrimination law. For example, comparative experience has shown that 
fixed-term and part-time employees are often predominantly female and the 
concept of indirect gender discrimination has been used to establish some 
parity with permanent employees.
15 Arguably, if specific rights exist which 
14 
Of the twenty grounds listed, only “pregnancy”, “family responsibility” and “HIV” are defined in section 
1. This section also contains a definition of “people with disabilities” which has been applied in the 
discrimination context, but arguably should only apply in the context of affirmative action (where this 
phrase is actually used). See Garbers “The prohibition of discrimination in employment: Performance 
and prognosis in a transformative context” in Labour Law into the Future 28 n 45.
15 
For example, in all of the following cases the practices were found to have a disproportionate impact on 
women: Jenkins v Kingsgate Ltd 2 CMLR 24 (paying part-time workers a lower hourly rate than full-
time workers); Clarke v Eley (IMI) Kynoch Ltd [1982] IRLR 482 (retrenching part-time workers before 
considering full-time workers); Bilka Kaufhaus v Weber von Harz [1986] CMLR 701 (requiring full-time 
employment for occupational pension benefits); Rinner Kuhn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudedereinigung GmbH 
& Co KG [1989] IRLR 493 (granting sick leave only to employees working more than 10 hours per week or 
45 hours per month); Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Employment [1994] 1 All 
ER 910 (requiring part-time employees to work for three years longer than full-time employees to qualify 
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address prejudice associated with discrimination, there is no need for a 
general protection against discrimination, especially a concept as challenging 
as indirect discrimination.
For now, discrimination law remains important – not only as a general 
baseline mechanism for the recognition and protection of marginalised and 
potentially marginalised groups in society and in employment, but also as a 
transformative mechanism. Yet, even at this early stage, one may sound a note 
of caution: protection against unfair discrimination in employment is but one 
(limited) mechanism that may contribute to transformation. In our divided 
society – where the roots of the division between the “have’s” and the “have 
not’s” and between capital and labour are rooted in past discrimination, the 
temptation is to view anti-discrimination law as the solution to all (labour 
market) ills. However, in a world where different mechanisms (or institutions) 
are available to address past and current disadvantage, one should take care 
to ascribe responsibility for redress and change correctly. In a labour market 
where employees are also protected – among other things – by collective 
bargaining, affirmative action and against unfair labour practices (especially 
post – Apollo Tyres
16
), one should always be mindful of the true nature of anti-
discrimination law, what its goals are and what its contribution to employee 
protection, workplace change and transformation is supposed to be. 
Against the background of these remarks, the purpose of this article is 
to reflect on the challenges we have faced and continue to face in giving a 
sound and clear conceptual foundation to our employment discrimination 
law – a foundation which is a necessary precondition for its sensible, practical 
application and its proper impact. In doing so, a number of topics will be 
addressed. First, in part 2 below and in the absence of a definition of unfair 
discrimination in the EEA – we need, as point of departure, to (re)consider 
the ground rules for the interpretation of the EEA. Secondly – in part 3 – an 
overview of the judicial development and state of employment discrimination 
law at the time of the amendments will be provided. Part 4 is devoted to a 
reflection on the meaning and impact of the amendments. Part 5 will conclude.
2  Ground rules for interpreting the EEA
To state the obvious – ascertaining the meaning of the EEA is a question of 
interpretation of the Act itself. The EEA, however, does not exist in a vacuum: 
it functions against the background of our international obligations – notably 
the International Labour Organisation’s Convention on Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) (“ILO Convention 111”)
17
 – as well as the 
Constitution. The EEA itself recognises as much in section 3(a), which requires 
interpretation of the Act “in compliance with the Constitution”, and section 
3(d), which requires interpretation “in compliance with the international law 
for statutory dismissal protection and for dismissal and redundancy payments). 
16 
Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration 2013 34 ILJ 1120 
(LAC).
17 C 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention of 1958. South Africa ratified the 
Convention on 5 March 1997. 
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obligations of the Republic, in particular those contained in the International 
Labour Organisation Convention (C111) concerning Discrimination in Respect 
of Employment and Occupation”.
18
 But while the EEA requires interpretation 
of the EEA in the light of both the Constitution and ILO Convention 111, one 
further important remark needs to be made: as far as the meaning and the 
structure of the concept of unfair discrimination are concerned, the EEA is 
virtually silent. From this it should be clear that we can expect the interpretive 
influence of the Constitution and the Convention to be the greatest in that area 
where it is needed most – the meaning of “unfair discrimination”. 
It is perhaps best to deal with ILO Convention 111 first. It has been relied on 
as ostensibly creating a prescriptive structure for South African employment 
equality law, specifically in that it does not create room for the notion of unfair 
or fair discrimination (only discrimination or non-discrimination) and also 
that it does not allow for any defences to discrimination claims other than 
the inherent requirement of a job or affirmative action as mentioned in ILO 
Convention 111.
19
 However, as far as the interpretive role of the ILO Convention 
is concerned, a number of remarks may be made. First, the ILO Convention 
itself does not preclude the domestic implementation or operationalisation of 
the Convention by ratifying states in idiosyncratic fashion. While it is true that 
ILO Convention 111 gives us a definition of discrimination (for purposes of 
the Convention),
20
 provides for so-called special measures
21
 and – somewhat 
superficially – simply declares that “an inherent requirement of a job” and 
“special measures” shall “not be deemed to be discrimination”,
22
 article 2 
places an obligation on ratifying states “to declare and pursue a national policy 
designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions, equality 
of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a 
view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof” (own emphasis). In 
addition, article 3(b) provides for the discretionary enactment of legislation to 
secure acceptance and observance of the national policy referred to in article 
2. Furthermore, focusing on the detail mentioned in ILO Convention 111, the 
definition of discrimination in article 1(1) of the Convention reads as follows:
“(a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality 
of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation;”
There are two ways to read this definition. One way – clearly incorrect, 
we submit – is to say that the mere existence of a distinction based on one of 
the grounds mentioned, is discrimination in a final pejorative sense (and that 
the second part of the definition is merely descriptive). If, however, one gives 
due regard to the literal meaning of the definition, it becomes clear that it is 
18 
Subsections 3(b) and 3 (c) furthermore require interpretation “so as to give effect to [the] purpose of the 
EEA” and “taking into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of [the EEA] or any 
other employment law”.
19 
See D du Toit “Protection against Unfair Discrimination: Cleaning up the Act?” (2014) 35 ILJ 2623 and 
his own earlier work referenced at n 44.
20 
In article 1(1) of ILO Convention 111.
21 
In article 5.
22 
In articles 1(2) and 5.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW INTO THE FUTURE 241
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
not the mere existence of a distinction, exclusion or preference based on the 
grounds listed that constitutes discrimination in a final pejorative sense – it 
must also have the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or 
treatment. This would mean that the final determination of the acceptability or 
otherwise of discrimination is more fluid from a South African perspective; it 
then becomes easy to argue that the definition in ILO Convention 111 leaves 
room for (and arguably requires) the introduction of a “fair” or “unfair” 
approach (or something similar) to discrimination in order to accommodate 
a consideration of the actual impact or effect of the distinction, exclusion or 
preference, even though it took place on one of the grounds listed (as is the case 
in both our Constitution and the EEA, which prohibit “unfair discrimination”). 
Furthermore, article 1(2) of ILO Convention 111 leaves it open to member 
states to identify other distinctions, exclusions or preferences which have 
the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment or opportunity. 
At the very least, these arguments already mean that any suggestion that the 
definition of “discrimination” in ILO Convention 111 precludes consideration 
of some type of balancing act between the interests of employer and employee 
to determine the acceptability or otherwise of an employer’s discrimination, 
is suspect. The same may be said of the suggestion that our legislation (as 
interpreted) – which prohibits only “unfair” discrimination – is not in line 
with ILO Convention 111. 
In fact, one cannot help but notice that ILO Convention 111, which 
comes to us from 1958, shows its age compared to the EEA. It mentions 
only seven grounds of discrimination (including race), does not speak of 
affirmative action (but instead “special measures”) and does not immediately 
identify “race” as a ground which is “generally recognised” to “require 
special protection or assistance” (it does, however, mention “sex” and 
“disablement”).
23
 Furthermore, by their very nature conventions are generally 
formulated, constitute a “baseline” and, as illustrated above, are fluid. While 
ILO Convention 111 remains important and is a guiding light for domestic 
equality law, that law should ultimately be developed appropriate to our own 
national conditions. In any event, ILO Convention 111 can never be taken 
to mean that it prohibits something provided for in domestic law simply 
because it is not expressly provided for in the Convention. Domestic law 
might well be more effective and better suited to national conditions than 
ILO Convention 111 – especially where we prohibit discrimination on a large 
number of grounds in all employment policies and practices. In this regard, it 
may already be said that the word “unfair” in our legislation arguably has an 
important value. It forces us to always consider the impact of discrimination 
and what makes it unfair. The real danger of simply working with a deeming 
provision and the distinction between discrimination and non-discrimination 
(as the Convention does) is that the underlying unfairness of discrimination 
will never be unpacked and we will never truly appreciate the marginalisation 
of, and the effect of that marginalisation on, all the different groups in society 
23 
In articles 1(a) and 5(2) respectively.
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we seek to protect. Ultimately, only a true appreciation of marginalisation will 
lead to true transformation (especially in case of the lesser-known grounds). 
And, as will be argued below, the so-called dangers of “fairness” are more 
apparent than real – in the South African context it has developed into a 
clearly defined and quite stringent approach to the acceptability or otherwise 
of discrimination.
24
 In any event, the formulation of idiosyncratic standards 
to balance competing interests in the area of employment discrimination law 
across different jurisdictions – standards that depart from the exact wording 
of ILO Convention 111 – is hardly contentious.
25
 Put differently – if “fairness” 
in the discrimination context is given content in a sensible and responsible 
manner, it neither violates the ILO Convention, nor international best practice.
The interpretive influence of the Constitution on the EEA is, as point of 
departure, shaped by the principle of subsidiarity (or, as some would have 
it, constitutional avoidance): where legislation gives effect to a constitutional 
right (as the EEA does) any remedy for infringement of that right should be 
sought in the ordinary legislation itself.
26 At a first level, this simply means 
that the EEA is the primary source of employment equality law. By necessary 
implication it also means that, in the absence of constitutional challenge, the 
role of the Constitution becomes that of an interpretive guide to the EEA. It 
also means that the magnitude of this interpretive role will, and has to, vary 
according to the detail contained in legislation. In turn, this simply means 
that we can (rightly) expect a large measure of Constitutional influence where 
legislation itself is sparse (such as on the meaning of unfair discrimination in 
the EEA). Having said this, one should also be mindful of the dictate that even 
where legislation is clear, interpretation should be purposive and compliant 
with the Constitution, even more so where legislation relates to transformation 
and is “umbilically linked to the Constitution”.
27
 
It must be mentioned that the Constitution – as an interpretive guide to the 
EEA – has muddied the waters in at least one important respect. Perhaps the 
biggest challenge to our equality law has been to find a sensible articulation 
between affirmative action and unfair discrimination. What we do know is 
that affirmative action that oversteps the boundaries of the law may constitute 
unfair discrimination while affirmative action that does not, is not unfair 
discrimination. This much is clear from at least two Constitutional Court 
judgments
28
 and the EEA.
29
 The challenge relates to how to get to this 
point. The Constitution declares discrimination on a listed ground to be 
24 
It has been pointed out that instead of using “fairness”, one could interpret “the inherent requirement 
of a job” along the lines of “fairness” as developed in South Africa – see Garbers “The prohibition of 
discrimination in employment: Performance and prognosis in a transformative context” in Labour Law 
into the Future 33 ff. 
25 
33 ff.
26 
See, eg, South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) para 51: 
“where legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass that 
legislation and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of 
the constitutional standard.”
27 
See Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) paras 51-53.
28 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 36; Solidarity v Department of Correctional 
Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC).
29 
Section 6(2) of the EEA.
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presumptively unfair – and this while all exclusionary decisions in the interest 
of affirmative action in the employment context are always based on listed 
grounds (race or sex). By definition, then, the Constitution seems to declare 
affirmative action to be presumptively unfair discrimination and, at best – 
and if lawful – fair discrimination. The idea that affirmative action is at best 
fair discrimination has been addressed and rejected decisively by our highest 
court.
30 Even so, the point for now is that one should not allow difficulties 
around the constitutional onus provision (or simply a firm belief in the need 
for redress) to unduly influence the development of our anti-discrimination 
law – especially in the form of strict adherence to the view that there can be 
no such thing as “fair” discrimination.
3   The judicial development of employment discrimination law 
and trends in litigation prior to the amendments 
3 1  The structure and application of unfair discrimination
3 1 1  Discrimination, unfair discrimination, and the justification of 
unfair discrimination
Bearing the dictates of interpretation in mind, the past two decades or so have 
undeniably shown that the structure of “unfair discrimination” established by 
the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane NO and Others (“Harksen”)
31
 
remains determinative in employment discrimination cases. In terms of this 
view – building on a clear distinction between differentiation, discrimination, 
and unfair discrimination – discrimination (not unfair discrimination) only 
exists when (in the employment context) a sufficient link is shown between 
the policy or practice in question and an identifiable and applicable ground of 
discrimination. This link, of course, may be direct or indirect. In subsequent 
decisions – of the Labour Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”), as 
well as the Constitutional Court
32
 – one recurring theme has been a clear 
measure of comfort with the basic distinction made in Harksen as well as with 
the idea of the “unfairness” or “fairness” of “discrimination”. Furthermore, 
this has been the approach not only in cases where the constitutionality of 
legislation has been attacked (as was the case in Harksen), but also where the 
alleged discriminatory conduct of both the state and private organisations was 
under scrutiny.
33
 This experience clearly contradicts the view that the word 
“unfair” (especially in the employment context) is no more than a tautological 
adjective, a meaningless reminder of what “discrimination” in any event 
means. In fact, Harksen went further and gave us a baseline approach to 
unfairness: 
30 
See Van Heerden and Minister of Correctional Services 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 36. See also South 
African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC).
31 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
32 
For the most recent judgments, see the text to part 3 1 4 below.
33 
See Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) and Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie 2015 36 ILJ 1805 
(CC).
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“In the final analysis it is the impact of the discrimination on the complainant that is the determining 
factor regarding the unfairness of the discrimination. 
 In order to determine whether the discriminatory provision has impacted on complainants unfairly, 
various factors must be considered. These would include:
(a)  the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past from 
patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the case under consideration is on a 
specified ground or not;
(b)   the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. If its purpose 
is manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the complainants in the manner 
indicated above, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal, such as, for 
example, the furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the 
particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact 
suffered the impairment in question.
…
(c)   with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an 
impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably 
serious nature.
These factors, assessed objectively, will assist in giving ‘precision and elaboration’ to the constitutional 
test of unfairness. They do not constitute a closed list. Others may emerge as our equality jurisprudence 
continues to develop. In any event it is the cumulative effect of these factors that must be examined 
and in respect of which a determination must be made as to whether the discrimination is unfair.”
34
Put differently, Harksen made it clear that “fairness” primarily depends 
on the impact on the complainant, but also depends on the vulnerability of 
the group in question, the purpose of the measure in question and “any other 
relevant factors”. The court also clearly stated that fairness is determined by 
the cumulative effect of these factors. 
Where things have become a bit muddled is that Harksen also tells us – at 
least in the constitutional context – that unfair discrimination may be justified 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
35
 This section, however, only applies 
to laws of general application, clearly not to individualised conduct. In at least 
one case, even though decided in the context of PEPUDA, the Constitutional 
Court seemed to express doubt about the application of section 36 justification 
factors in the context of individualised discriminatory conduct.
36
 But at the 
same time, the meaning of “fairness” as developed by the Constitutional Court 
itself – already apparent from the Harksen formulation quoted above – and 
also applied in the context of discriminatory conduct, includes more objective, 
“justification” factors. In fact, it seems easy to argue that in Harksen, the 
34 
Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 51-52.
35 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution states that 
“[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including (a) the nature of the 
right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.”
36 
MEC For Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 70 where the court said, with 
reference to section 14 of PEPUDA (which provides a list of factors influencing the fairness or otherwise 
of discrimination): 
“The list of factors in s 14(3) includes issues that traditionally fall under a fairness analysis … and 
questions normally relevant to a limitation analysis under s 36(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the 
fairness test under the Equality Act as it stands may involve a wider range of factors than are relevant 
to the test of fairness in terms of s 9 of the Constitution. Whether that approach is consistent with the 
Constitution is not before us, and we address the question on the legislation as it stands”.
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Constitutional Court already made the idea of proportionality (in the sense of 
the importance of the goal, the extent of the infringement and the relationship 
between means and ends), which is the cornerstone of justification (in the 
constitutional sense), an integral part of “fairness” – as it arguably should be. 
What is also true is that the EEA continues to specifically mention only two 
defences to unfair discrimination claims – an inherent requirement of a job 
and affirmative action consistent with the purpose of the EEA.37 Mention of 
these defences is paired with the statement that should these defences apply, 
the employer’s conduct “is not unfair discrimination”. This gave rise to the 
question whether these are the only defences available to discrimination 
claims and also whether the presence of these defences means there is no 
discrimination to begin with, whether it makes the discrimination fair, 
or whether it justifies unfair discrimination. By the time the amendments 
to the EEA came into force, the prevailing judicial view was that the two 
defences mentioned in the EEA are not the only available defences (but that 
employers may argue “fairness” grounds in addition to these defences); that 
it is not necessary to enquire whether these defences make otherwise unfair 
discrimination fair; that the two defences mentioned rather should simply be 
seen as complete defences which defeat the case; and, based on the express 
wording of the old section 11 of the EEA, it was not possible for discrimination 
in the employment context to be “justified”.38
These developments also address three arguments raised over the years. 
First, there is the argument that in the context of South African employment 
discrimination law, there is no such thing as fair discrimination,
39
 an argument 
clearly not supported by case law. Secondly, a more refined version of this 
argument held that the acceptability of “discrimination” is and should 
be determined not by “fairness”, but by legitimacy and proportionality.
40
 
This argument is addressed by the reality that proportionality – as already 
evidenced by Harksen – is part and parcel of our view of “fairness”. Thirdly, 
the flip-side of the second argument mentioned is that, given the importance 
of equality, we need a more exacting standard than fairness in our search 
for the limits of discrimination.
41
 As the further discussion will show, this 
argument loses sight of one simple reality: the idea of “fair” discrimination 
– started in Harksen and developed over the years – is, in fact, subject to a 
clear and stringent standard which rests on four pillars – dignity (as the prime 
determinant), rationality, proportionality and individual accommodation. 
3 1 2 The test for recognition of unlisted grounds of discrimination
Harksen (with reference to Prinsloo v Van der Linde (“Prinsloo”)
42
) also gave 
us a test for the recognition of so-called unlisted grounds of discrimination:
37 
S 6(2) of the EEA.
38 
See the text to part 3 1 4 below.
39 
This is the view of Du Toit (2014) ILJ 2623.
40 See B Hepple “Can discrimination ever be fair?” in K Malherbe & J Sloth-Nielsen (eds) Labour Law into 
the Future: Essays in honour of D’Arcy du Toit Juta (2012) 1 ff.
41 
See 1 ff. 
42 
1997 3 SA 1012 (CC).
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“There will be discrimination on an unspecified ground if it is based on attributes or characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect 
them adversely in a comparably serious manner.”
43
This test was subsequently expanded on by the Constitutional Court,
44
 but 
it has never strayed from its early direction: discrimination is about an impact 
on dignity – it is about attributes or characteristics that make us who we are. It 
is not about mere difference – in the words of the Constitutional Court: 
“[t]he Constitution … prohibits the breach of equality not by mere fact of difference but rather by 
that of discrimination. This nuance is of importance so that the concept of equality is not trivialised or 
reduced to a simple matter of difference.”
45
This test for unlisted grounds was also accepted in the Labour Courts.
46
 
What is also true is that for a brief period of transition, the general prohibition 
on discrimination in employment was contained as an unfair labour practice 
in Schedule 7 to the LRA. During this time, unfair discrimination was 
prohibited on “any arbitrary ground, including” the listed grounds. This 
resulted in at least one decision – Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries 
(“Kadiaka”)
47
 – where the court took the word arbitrary at face value and 
43 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 49.
44 
Already in Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 53 the court elaborated as follows: 
“I would caution against any narrow definition of these terms. What the specified grounds have in 
common is that they have been used (or misused) in the past (both in South Africa and elsewhere) to 
categorise, marginalise and often oppress persons who have had, or who have been associated with, 
these attributes or characteristics. These grounds have the potential, when manipulated, to demean 
persons in their inherent humanity and dignity. There is often a complex relationship between these 
grounds. In some cases they relate to immutable biological attributes or characteristics, in some to 
the associational life of humans, in some to the intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of 
humanity and in some cases to a combination of one or more of these features … Section 8(2) seeks 
to prevent the unequal treatment of people based on such criteria which may, amongst other things, 
result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage such as has occurred only too visibly in society.”
In accepting citizenship as an unlisted ground of discrimination the Constitutional Court in Larbi-Odam 
v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) 1998 1 SA 745 (CC) (“Larbi-
Odam”) quoted with approval from Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia 1989 56 DLR (4th) 1 (at 
32): 
“Relative to citizens, non-citizens are a group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to 
having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated. They are 
among “those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest 
in attending”.” 
The court in Larbi-Odam went on to state that 
“citizenship is a personal attribute which is difficult to change. In that regard, I would like to note 
the following views of La Forest J, from [Andrews par 39]: “The characteristic of citizenship is one 
typically not within the control of the individual and, in this sense, is immutable. Citizenship is, at 
least temporarily, a characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious action and in some cases 
not alterable except on the basis of unacceptable costs.” 
What all of this seems to say is that the test for recognition of unlisted grounds is quite strict and includes 
the identification of a distinct group, sharing commonality and worthy of protection; the ground has to 
be related to the listed grounds in that it impacts, or has the potential to impact dignity; this required 
relationship with the listed grounds also requires immutability; immutability means that a person cannot 
control the attribute or characteristic in that it cannot be changed (albeit temporarily) by conscious action 
and, to the extent that the attribute or characteristic may be changed, this can only be done at unacceptable 
cost. See also the remarks focusing on the impact of the vulnerability and dignity of HIV – positive 
persons the court made in Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) 2370-2371 in the course of 
recognising HIV status to be an unlisted ground (for purposes of the Constitution).
45 
Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) para 30 (per Nkabinde J).
46 
See Middleton v Industrial Chemical Carriers (Pty) Ltd 2001 22 ILJ 472 (LC); Ntai v SA Breweries Ltd 
2001 22 ILJ 214 (LC); IMATU v City of Cape Town 2005 11 BLLR 1084 (LC).
47 
Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries 1999 20 ILJ 373 (LC).
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sought discrimination in the lack of purpose or capriciousness of employer 
conduct, rather than in an identifiable ground based on the dignity inherent in 
the concept of discrimination. This decision – in our view incorrectly decided 
– is dealt with below.
48 Perhaps significant for purposes of the discussion to 
follow, is that the Labour Appeal Court (“LAC”) went as far as equating the 
word “arbitrary” in section 187(1)(f) of the LRA (which follows the same 
wording as the old Schedule 7 prohibition on discrimination) with the meaning 
of “unlisted” grounds as established in Harksen. In dealing with a dismissal 
based on depression in the context of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, the court in 
New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Marsland
49
 had this to say:
“It is not strictly necessary to decide whether the concept of ‘disability’ as set out as a ground in 
section 187 (1) (f) describes the condition suffered by respondent … even were [the] condition not to 
be considered a form of disability as set out in section 187 (1) (f), unquestionably the discrimination 
suffered by respondent as a result of his ‘mental health problem’ had, in the words of Stein AJ, 
‘the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of that person as a human being or to affect him 
in a comparably serious manner’. Expressed differently, the question can be posed thus: did the 
conduct of the appellant impair the dignity of the respondent; that is did the conduct of the appellant 
objectively analysed on the ground of the characteristics of the respondent, in this case depression, 
have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of respondent? See for the source of this 
approach, Harksen v Lane NO [1997] ZACC 12; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); Hoffmann v South 
African Airways [2000] ZACC 17; 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). In my view, the question must be answered 
affirmatively. The conduct of appellant clearly constituted an egregious attack on the dignity of 
respondent and accordingly falls within the grounds set out in section 187 (1) (f) of the Act”.
Further guidance from the LAC comes from an unlikely context. As we 
know, section 5 of the LRA curiously makes use of the word discrimination in 
the context of protection of freedom of association. In Safcor Freight (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Safcor Panalpina v SA Freight and Dock Workers Union
50
 the court stated 
with reference to section 9(3) of the Constitution and union membership:
“[A]s far as the anti-discrimination clause (section 9(3)) is concerned, it prohibits discrimination on 
the grounds listed therein or on analogous grounds. Union membership is not a listed ground and it 
is unlikely to be considered an analogous ground because such discrimination does not involve the 
requisite level of injury to human dignity.”
51
3 1 3 The test for causation and the onus of proof
The courts also determined that the onus to establish discrimination in both 
the constitutional and employment contexts remained on the applicant (with 
the employer called on to show it was fair, if on a listed ground). The pre-
amendment wording of section 11 of the EEA facilitated this approach.
52
 What 
was also evident (and this will be discussed in more detail below) is that the 
sting in the onus tail was not so much in what it clearly meant, but what it was 
seen to say about the structure of “unfair discrimination”. As far as the test 
for causation was concerned, the courts were not particularly consistent. The 
48 
See the text to part 4 3 below.
49 
New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Marsland 2009 30 ILJ 2875 (LAC) paras 24-26.
50 
2013 34 ILJ 335 (LAC).
51 Para 18.
52 
See the text to n 9 above.
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early decision of Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd
53
 raised three 
possibilities – any contamination by a ground of discrimination is enough, 
an immaterial contamination is not sufficient, or discrimination exists to 
the extent of the contamination. In general, one could say that the courts 
mostly applied a “but for” test (and sometimes a more standard approach to 
causation, largely flip sides of the same coin).54 For example, in Department of 
Correctional Services v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (“POPCRU”)
55
 
we find the following remarks:
“The appellants’ counsel conceded most of the issues previously raised by his predecessor. These 
included a concession that the dress code operated disparately among correctional officers and 
was directly discriminatory on all three proscribed grounds, namely religion, culture and gender. 
The concession was well made. Indeed, but for their religious and cultural beliefs, the respondents 
would not have worn dreadlocks. And but for that fact and their male gender, they would not have 
been dismissed. The disparate treatment constituted discrimination and the appellants’ motives and 
objectives of the dress code are entirely irrelevant for this finding.”56
It has to be said that the “but for” test of causation fits easily with 
the differential treatment inherent in direct discrimination. In indirect 
discrimination cases, the link is established through proof of a disproportionate 
impact of a policy or practice on a protected group coupled with proof of 
membership of the prejudiced group. This requires an often statistically 
complex comparison of compliance rates between different groups (where 
those groups are distinguished based on a ground of discrimination). 
3 1 4  The last words of the Constitutional Court, the SCA, the 
LAC and the Labour Court on the meaning of “unfair 
discrimination” prior to the amendments
In case of any uncertainty about the state of our employment discrimination 
law by the time the amendments came into force, it is perhaps worthwhile to 
mention a number of decisions on employment discrimination handed down 
by different courts immediately prior to the amendments.
In Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie
57
 the Constitutional Court considered an 
application for leave to appeal where the complainant alleged discrimination 
based on her “race and social origin or an arbitrary ground”. Her complaint 
was based on the refusal by a firm of attorneys to allow her to commence 
employment without having finished her LLB degree (the allegation was made 
that the firm had allowed other candidates – one black and two white – to 
commence employment without LLB degrees). In considering her prospects 
of success, a unanimous court stated, as point of departure and with reference 
to Harksen, that:
“The EEA proscribes unfair discrimination in a manner akin to section 9 of the Constitution. Apart 
from permitting differentiation on the basis of the internal (sic) requirements of a job in section 6(2)(b), 
53 2000 21 ILJ 188 (LC) 197-198. 
54 
See, eg, Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 2000 21 ILJ 571 (LAC).
55 
2013 34 ILJ 1375 (SCA). See also Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC).
56 2013 34 ILJ 1375 (SCA) para 18.
57 2015 36 ILJ 1805 (CC). See also the remarks of Jafta J in Sali v National Commissioner of the SA Police 
Service 2014 35 ILJ 2727 (CC) paras 7-16.
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the test for unfair discrimination in the context of labour law is comparable to that laid down by this 
court in Harksen.
 The first step is to establish whether the respondent’s policy differentiates between people. The 
second step entails establishing whether that differentiation amounts to discrimination. The third step 
involves determining whether the discrimination is unfair”
58
 (footnotes omitted).
This statement clearly shows that Harksen remains determinative of 
discriminatory conduct in the employment context and that “fairness” is 
the ultimate determinant of the acceptability or otherwise of discrimination 
(despite the specific mention of “an inherent requirement of a job” in section 
6(2) of the EEA).
59
 Particularly interesting in this regard was the acceptance 
by the court that “business needs of the respondent dictated that these [other] 
candidate attorneys be retained under these circumstances”, followed later by 
the statement that: 
“[I]t must be stressed that an employer’s business and operational needs will not simply be accepted 
on the employer’s own say-so. It must be shown, objectively, that there are genuine and legitimate 
business and operational needs that justify the differential treatment of employees. We believe that, in 
this case, the respondent has adequately done so.”
60
Clearly – and in line with the approach to fairness laid down in Harksen 
– the court was willing to consider (and this may be seen both as part of 
rationality and as part of proportionality as an aspect of fairness) the “genuine 
and legitimate business and operational needs” as an important factor 
influencing the fairness of discriminatory conduct in employment. The SCA 
also adopted the Harksen approach in POPCRU
61
 and was quite comfortable 
seeing the “inherent requirement of a job” as justification for otherwise unfair 
discrimination (despite upholding the claim).
62
In a comprehensive judgment handed down barely two months before the 
amendments to the EEA were promulgated, the LAC was called on to consider 
– in SA Airways v Jansen van Vuuren
63
 – a claim of unfair discrimination on 
the basis of age. The claim arose from a collective agreement which provided 
for the lower payment of pilots over the age of 60 compared to pilots under the 
age of 60. The employer sought to justify the discrimination on the basis that 
this differentiation was the product of collective bargaining and contained in a 
collective agreement. In rejecting this argument and upholding the claim, and 
in line with what was said above, the LAC accepted the following principles:
(i) Despite the court being fully aware of ILO Convention 111 and its role 
in the interpretation of the EEA, it accepted that “material guidance is 
to be derived from the equality analyses that were conducted under the 
Constitution and the interim Constitution”;
64
 
58 
Paras 25-26.
59 
While the court used the word “justified” in the course of its judgment, it is clear that it was considering 
the “fairness” of the employer’s conduct.
60 Para 38.
61 
See the text to n 55 above.
62 
Paras 21, 23 and 25.
63 
2014 35 ILJ 2774 (LAC).
64 
Para 29.
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(ii) With reference to Harksen and Prinsloo, the court adopted a two-stage 
analysis: “the first stage would be to determine whether the conduct or 
measure of the employer, which the employee is complaining about, 
constitutes “discrimination”. The second stage is to consider whether it 
is “unfair”;
65
(iii) As far as the onus is concerned, and despite the absence of an express 
deeming provision in (the old) section 11 of the EEA, the effect of (the 
old) section 11 of the EEA is the same as the onus provision in the 
Constitution – “unless the employer establishes that the discrimination 
is fair, it would be unfair”;
66
(iv) Section 11 of the EEA (as it was worded prior to the amendments) does 
not allow for justification of otherwise unfair discrimination;67 
(v) With reference to President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,
68
 City 
Council of Pretoria v Walker,
69
 Hoffmann v South African Airways,
70
 
Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler 
(Pty) Ltd (“Leonard Dingler”),
71
 National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd
72
 as well as the wording of (the old) section 11 
of the EEA, the court formulated the following principles relating to the 
fairness of discrimination:
• “no clear distinction can be drawn between the considerations 
involved in determining fairness and those involved when 
determining justification”;73
• “ideally in determining fairness, moral considerations and the 
impact of the measure complained of … should be assessed”; 
74
 
• section 11 of “the EEA recognises that there may be considerations 
other than those specifically referred to in section 6(2) which may 
render the discrimination fair”;
75
• an inherent requirement of a job and affirmative action specifically 
mentioned in section 6(2) of the EEA “are complete defences to an 
allegation of unfair discrimination”;
76
• in determining fairness in the general sense, the court will have 
to exercise a value judgement based on consideration of all 
relevant factors. The determining factor remains the impact of the 
discrimination on the victim,
77
 but relevant factors may include 
economic arguments, commercial requirements, the approach of 
65 
Para 35.
66 
Para 36.
67 Para 38. The new section 11 now expressly allows for justification – see the text to part 4 4 below.
68 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC).
69 
City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC).
70 
Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC).
71 
Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 285 (LC). 
72 
NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 17 ILJ 455 (A).
73 
SA Airways v Jansen van Vuuren 2014 35 ILJ 2774 (LAC) para 39.
74 
Para 39.
75 
Para 45.
76 
Para 45.
77 
This comes from President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC), Harksen v Lane NO 
and Others 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) and Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC).
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competitors,
78
 the legitimacy of the goal of the discrimination, 
as well as the proportionality and rationality of the mode of 
discrimination relative to its goal.
79
 This, in essence, calls for a 
balancing of the interests of the employer with that of employees.
80
 
Further down the ladder, the Labour Court continued to apply the Harksen 
approach to discrimination and unfair discrimination in respect of the pre-
amendment EEA – in cases such as Bandat v De Kock
81
 and Brink v Legal Aid 
South Africa.
82
 
3 2   Trends and patterns in discrimination litigation prior to the 
amendments
83
 
Despite growing certainty about the meaning and structure of “unfair 
discrimination” as described above, litigation of the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against showed certain trends prior to 2014, trends worthy 
of consideration as we look to the future. First, there were relatively few 
discrimination cases, in all probability caused by a combination of jurisdiction 
vesting in the Labour Court only, uncertainty about and the challenges 
inherent in the concept of discrimination, as well as the fundamental reality 
that litigation and protection against unfair discrimination are not a good 
mix to begin with. Secondly, by far the majority were direct discrimination 
cases, with indirect discrimination finding little application in practice 
(due to a combination of factors – indirect discrimination is a difficult and 
poorly understood concept, affirmative action largely eliminates the need 
for indirect discrimination claims – at least on the basis of race or sex – 
while resort to direct discrimination claims based on unlisted grounds may 
eliminate the need for indirect claims based on listed grounds). Thirdly, the 
majority of these cases were unsuccessful. Fourthly, the unsuccessful cases 
were unsuccessful because they were defeated at the “discrimination” stage 
(and not the “fairness” stage). This was usually the result of one of three 
reasons: The inability of applicants to show differentiation to begin with; the 
development of a curious culture of unsupported reliance on unlisted grounds 
of discrimination evidenced by the inability of applicants to identify a ground 
or to show that the unlisted ground meets the test for recognition as an unlisted 
ground; or the inability of applicants to establish a sufficient “but for” link 
between the policy and the ground in question. Fifthly, in many cases reliance 
was placed on unfair discrimination where there was no more than a vague 
78 
These three factors come from Hoffman.
79 
This comes primarily from Dingler where the court stated that “[d]iscrimination is unfair if it 
is reprehensible in terms of society’s prevailing norms. Whether or not society will tolerate the 
discrimination depends on what the object is of the discrimination and the means used to achieve it. The 
object must be legitimate and the means proportional and rational” (at 295 H). 
80 
SA Airways v Jansen van Vuuren 2014 35 ILJ 2774 (LAC) paras 39-45. The idea that fairness is not one-
sided but remains a double-edged sword and always calls for a balancing act comes from Vetsak.
81 
2015 36 ILJ 979 (LC) para 16 ff.
82 
2015 36 ILJ 1020 (LC) para 64 ff.
83 
This is a restatement of the review included in Garbers “The prohibition of discrimination in employment: 
Performance and prognosis in a transformative context” in Labour Law into the Future.
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notion of unfairness, but little appreciation that a link with an identifiable 
and applicable ground in a discrimination case is necessary. Rather than 
being a frontline mechanism for the recognition of dignity, the elimination 
of marginalisation and transformation in workplaces, unfair discrimination 
was often reduced to a vague and opportunistic (if unsuccessful) avenue 
triggered not by insult to dignity. Sixthly, the discrimination cases that were 
successful were the so-called affirmative action cases (where the employer in 
effect conceded the merits of “discrimination” and bore the onus of proving 
that the affirmative action was consistent with the purpose of the EEA). 
Lastly, because most discrimination cases were defeated at the discrimination 
stage, the courts never really grappled with the available defences against 
discrimination claims – either “fairness” generally or in the sense of an 
“inherent requirement of a job”. 
4  The 2014 amendments to the EEA
84
4 1  Introduction
For present purposes, and in line with the theme of the earlier discussion, 
the important amendments were those with the potential to impact on both 
the structure and our understanding of unfair discrimination law. With this in 
mind, the focus necessarily is on:
• the expansion of the CCMA’s jurisdiction to include sexual harassment 
cases (harassment as unfair discrimination) and all unfair discrimination 
cases where applicants earn below the threshold;
85
• the insertion of the words “any other arbitrary ground” into section 6(1) 
of the EEA after the list of grounds expressly mentioned in that section 
(ostensibly for “clarification” and to bring section 6(1) of the EEA in line 
with section 187(1)(f) of the LRA);86
• the inclusion of a completely overhauled section 11, dealing with the onus 
of proof in discrimination cases;
87
 and
• the express prohibition of “equal pay” discrimination88 and the refinement 
of the regulation of equal pay discrimination in the regulations published 
in terms of the EEA.
89
 Note, however, that the remarks below will not 
focus on equal pay as such, but rather on what these provisions contribute 
to our understanding of unfair discrimination.
84 
See the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 which came into operation on 1 August 2014.
85 
Section 10(6)(aA) now allows for employees referring discrimination disputes to the CCMA for arbitration 
(even in the absence of consent by the employer) “if (í) the employee alleges unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual harassment; or (b) in any other case, that employee earns less than the amount stated in 
the determination made by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act.”
86 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2012 Employment Equity Amendment Bill published 
in GG 35799 of 19 October 2012.
87 
This section is discussed in the text to part 4 4 below.
88 
Section 6(4) of the EEA now reads as follows: 
“A difference in terms and conditions of employment between employees of the same employer 
performing the same or substantially the same work or work of equal value that is directly or indirectly 
based on any one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (1), is unfair discrimination.” 
89 
Regulations 2-7 of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 GN R595 in GG 37873 of 1 August 2014.
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4 2  The jurisdiction of the CCMA
Given the reservations expressed earlier about the relative paucity of 
discrimination cases leading up to 2014, the broadening of the CCMA’s 
jurisdiction already has led to a significant increase in discrimination 
litigation.
90
 In principle, this development holds true potential for the 
contribution of discrimination law to baseline protection as well as 
transformation. Added to this, the powers given to commissioners in 
discrimination cases include not only the awarding of compensation and 
damages, but the making of “an order directing the employer to take steps to 
prevent the same unfair discrimination or a similar practice from occurring in 
the future in respect of similar employees”.
91
 At the same time, however, there 
are two areas of concern. First, it raises serious challenges around the capacity 
of the CCMA to deal with this new flood of cases. Secondly, heed should be 
taken of some of the trends identified in discrimination litigation mentioned 
earlier
92
 – notably what we referred to as the curious culture of reliance on 
unlisted grounds and the fact that discrimination cases more often than not 
originate in a vague notion of unfairness (rather than actual impairment of 
dignity). The experience thus far has shown that the majority of cases referred 
to the CCMA are so-called “arbitrary ground” cases (of which a large number 
have been equal pay cases).
93
 Put differently, the initial experience after the 
amendments has been one of an increase in the CCMA caseload, fuelled by a 
large number of “unlisted” or “arbitrary” ground cases.
It is submitted that there are a number of ways the CCMA may, as a point 
of departure, address this challenge. This, of course, also depends on how we 
view the meaning of “arbitrary ground” in section 6(1)
94
 and how we view the 
new onus provision in section 11:
95
 
• In all discrimination cases, the CCMA may insist on compliance with 
section 10(4)(b) of the EEA prior to conciliation. This section requires 
evidence to the satisfaction of the CCMA at the time of referral that the 
“referring party has made a reasonable attempt to resolve the dispute”. 
This could be interpreted to mean that the allegation of discrimination 
was properly raised with the employer (along the lines explained 
below), that the employer was given the opportunity to respond to these 
allegations and that this response was considered and rejected by the 
referring party. This information may already assist in reaching sensible 
solutions at conciliation.
90 
Information provided to the authors by the CCMA shows that in the immediate period after the 
amendments – until 31 March 2016 – 3 943 discrimination cases were referred to the CCMA. The 
communication with the CCMA is on file with the authors. 
91 Section 50(2)(c) read with section 48 of the EEA.
92 
See the discussion in the text to part 3 2 above.
93 
Of the referrals to discrimination in the period up to 31 March 2016, 2516 referrals were based on an 
“arbitrary ground” (64% of the total). There were 1085 referrals concerning equal pay, of which 881 were 
based on an “arbitrary ground”. The communication with the CCMA is on file with the authors.
94 
Discussed in the text to part 4 3 below.
95 
Discussed in the text to part 4 4 below.
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• Furthermore, it is a fundamental principle of our law that every litigant 
is at least entitled to know what the case against him or her is. To the 
extent that the word “allege” in the amended section 11 really means 
“allege”, one could at least expect employees to refer their cases properly 
(that is, to “allege” properly) – in the sense that the referral identifies the 
policy or practice concerned, the ground or grounds allegedly applicable 
(especially in case of an unlisted ground) and the reason why the applicant 
says it constitutes discrimination (that is, causation). If not, any employer 
faced with a mere allegation of discrimination has to consider at least 12 
broad possible employment practices
96
 and 20 possible listed grounds 
– let alone possible unlisted grounds. Put differently, a bland allegation 
of discrimination could be any one of 240 different discrimination 
scenarios (taking only listed grounds into consideration). In this regard, 
there are two rules
97
 the CCMA may fruitfully use prior to arbitration 
– rule 19, which empowers the CCMA or an arbitrating commissioner 
to direct the referring party to deliver a statement of case containing the 
material facts on which reliance is placed and the legal issues arising 
from those facts, and rule 20, which empowers the CCMA to direct the 
parties to hold a pre-arbitration meeting. Even in the absence of such 
a statement or meeting (and despite the onus being on the employer), 
there is also nothing wrong with presiding commissioners using their 
powers of “narrowing the issues” at the outset of proceedings to tease 
out this information. Furthermore, it is submitted that commissioners 
may also use their discretion to expect the applicant to testify first and 
to produce “some credible evidence” that unfair discrimination might be 
involved at which point the onus proper passes to the employer to prove 
the absence of discrimination, fairness or justification. This evidence 
should primarily be about the existence of discrimination
98
 (that is, 
whether there is differentiation, a valid comparison, an identified and 
applicable ground of discrimination, and a sufficient link between the 
differentiation and the ground in question). Our experience in the area of 
automatically unfair dismissals makes it clear that such an approach – of 
placing an initial evidential burden on the employee – does not violate a 
provision that the substantive burden remains on the employer.
99
 To some 
extent, these remarks have found judicial support in the Labour Court: 
in Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression
100
 where it was 
held that a discrimination award resulting from proceedings where there 
96 
In section 1 of the EEA there is a definition of “employment policy or practice” which includes (in a 
non-exhaustive list) 13 broad policies and practices, inclusive of dismissal. Discriminatory dismissal is 
still dealt with in terms of sections 187(1)(f) and 191(5)(b) of the LRA (which assigns jurisdiction to the 
Labour Court) and is left aside for the present discussion.
97 
See the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA GN 223 in GG 38572 of 17 March 2015.
98 
Not unfair discrimination – the presumption of unfairness follows if a link is established with a listed 
ground (ie if discrimination is established).
99 
See, eg, Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys 2000 21 ILJ 402 (LC) 407) and Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) 
Ltd 2005 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC) paras 28 and 88. 
100 2016 37 ILJ 2872 (LC).
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was an absence of identification of the (unlisted) ground in question is 
both reviewable and appealable.
101
 
• Commissioners will do well to constantly bear in mind that there are many 
ways to defeat allegations of discrimination: for example, the absence of 
a valid comparison (where appropriate and needed); the inapplicability 
of the alleged listed ground of discrimination; the inability to identify 
an unlisted ground of discrimination, or the inability to show that an 
(identified) unlisted ground meets the required test for recognition; 
the absence of a “but for” link
102
 (in direct discrimination cases) or a 
disproportionate impact (in indirect discrimination cases); and only then, 
consideration whether the discrimination was rational and not unfair, or 
otherwise justifiable (as to this, see the remarks below).
• If discrimination is alleged on an arbitrary ground, the full onus, of 
course, remains on the employee. Most of the remarks made above are 
also applicable here, but there is one important further consideration. 
Section 6(1) prohibits discrimination not on “arbitrariness” (that is, 
a vague feeling that there is differentiation and no good reason), but 
on an “arbitrary ground”.
103
 There is a difference between the two – 
discrimination requires identification of a ground. To the extent that 
“arbitrary ground” means the same as the established meaning of 
“unlisted grounds” (as discussed above, and it will be submitted below 
that it does), many spurious discrimination cases should already be 
dismissed on this basis.
104
 
In summary, given the ease of access to the CCMA, it has been called on to 
deal with a large number of discrimination cases. But the proper application 
of the law, the onus and its own procedures may serve to ferret out the good 
from the bad, often at a stage early enough or quickly enough to not create an 
undue burden. This will enable the CCMA to focus on “real discrimination” 
and, in so doing, give discrimination law a better chance to flourish, not only 
as baseline protection, but also as a force for transformation.
4 3   The structure of unfair discrimination – the meaning of “or any 
other arbitrary ground” 
An “arbitrary ground” as a prohibited ground for differentiation was initially 
included in the repealed Schedule 7 to the LRA. As originally enacted, the 
EEA itself did not contain a similar phrase although it did find a place in 
section 187(1)(f) of the LRA which characterised discriminatory dismissals as 
automatically unfair dismissals. The 2014 amendments introduced the concept 
of an “arbitrary ground” into the EEA. The explanatory memorandum to the 
amending statute stated that this amendment was introduced in order to bring 
the EEA in line with section 187(1)(f) of the LRA.105 
101 
Para 33.
102 
See the discussion in the text to part 3 1 3 above.
103 
See the discussion in the text to part 4 4 below.
104 
See the reference to the Pioneer Foods case in the text to n 100 above.
105 See the text to n 86 above.
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As to the meaning of “or any other arbitrary ground”, we have also had the 
benefit of at least one academic view – that of D’Arcy du Toit.106 According to 
Du Toit, relying on Kadiaka,
107
 arbitrary means “capricious”; its introduction 
broadens “the scope of the prohibition of discrimination from grounds that 
undermine human dignity to include grounds that are merely irrational” and, 
in so doing, “places an additional remedy at workers’ disposal which may 
further encourage employers to pay serious attention to workplace practices 
and procedures”. In coming to this conclusion, Du Toit relies heavily on the 
view that the re-introduction of the word “arbitrary” signifies a decisive break 
from especially Constitutional Court jurisprudence which expressly ties 
discrimination to dignity and grounds impacting on dignity.
108
There is no doubt that Du Toit is correct in his assessment that should 
section 6(1) be interpreted to in effect include a general right to rational 
differentiation, it would have a sweeping effect on the employment landscape. 
But, it is submitted that this view is wrong, for a number of reasons. 
First, to state the obvious, the EEA does not prohibit “differentiation”, it 
prohibits “discrimination”. Equality jurisprudence has consistently made 
it clear that, while there is a right to equality before the law in section 9(1) 
of the Constitution, which is taken to mean protection against irrational 
differentiation, this right is distinct from protection against discrimination 
(or, for that matter, unfair discrimination in sections 9(3) to 9(5) of the 
Constitution). The same jurisprudence has made it clear that differentiation 
in the section 9(1) sense can only ever be discrimination if the differentiation 
is based on a ground contemplated in section 9(3) to 9(5) – listed or unlisted 
(in the sense of an impact on dignity). Secondly, section 6(1) of the EEA does 
not prohibit “differentiation”, “arbitrariness” or “arbitrary discrimination”, it 
prohibits unfair discrimination on an “arbitrary ground”. It was mentioned 
earlier that the Constitutional Court has held that: 
“[t]he Constitution …prohibits the breach of equality not by mere fact of difference but rather by that 
of discrimination. This nuance is of importance so that the concept of equality is not trivialised or 
reduced to a simple matter of difference.”
109
The Constitutional Court has also stated that:
“Discrimination is a particular form of differentiation. Unlike ‘mere differentiation’, discrimination 
is differentiation on illegitimate grounds or on grounds that have historically been associated with 
patterns of disadvantage.”
110
 
In other words, the differentiation tail should not wag the discrimination 
dog. Both discrimination as a concept and the wording of section 6(1) of the 
EEA beg identification of a ground. In this regard, the muddle created by 
Kadiaka is best illustrated by exactly the quotation from that case Du Toit 
relies on:
106 
Du Toit (2014) ILJ 2623.
107 
See the text to n 47 above.
108 
Du Toit (2014) ILJ 2624 – 2628. The two quotations are at 2627 and 2628.
109 
Hassam v Jacobs NO and others 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) para 30 (per Nkabinde J).
110 
Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 395 (CC) 
para 43.
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“In my view … unfair discrimination on an arbitrary ground takes place where the discrimination 
is for no reason or is purposeless. But even if there is a reason, the discrimination may be arbitrary 
if the reason is not a commercial reason of sufficient magnitude that it outweighs the rights of the 
job-seeker …”.
111
Kadiaka shows a clear confusion in thinking between “arbitrariness” (in 
the sense of irrational differentiation) and an “arbitrary ground” (in the sense 
of a reason for, or identifiable ground that must exist, before discrimination 
can be said to exist). For discrimination you always need a ground, for 
arbitrariness (or irrationality) you do not. In fact, if one does view the meaning 
of “arbitrary” in section 6(1) as “arbitrariness”, the phrase “arbitrary ground” 
becomes a nonsensical oxymoron. After all, the apotheosis of arbitrariness is 
complete randomness – there cannot be any ground. It is then that one will 
find statements emanating from the CCMA as curious as the following: 
“It is not possible to state the ground on which they were discriminated against, save to say it appears 
to have been entirely arbitrary.”
112
Thirdly, section 6(1) prohibits discrimination through the phrase “or on any 
other arbitrary ground” (not, it should be emphasised, “any arbitrary ground”). 
This phrase follows the listed grounds, which also means that the wording of 
section 6(1) is different to that in section 187(1)(f) of the LRA and to that of 
the repealed Schedule 7. It is easy to make the argument that the meaning 
of “arbitrary ground” is, in the first instance, to be determined by reference 
to the preceding listed grounds. They are, as we know, all about dignity 
(not arbitrariness). This already means that the established test for unlisted 
grounds should remain controlling. Fourthly, and in any event, even in the 
context of section 187(1)(f) – where the word “arbitrary” precedes the listed 
grounds (as was the case with the old Item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7) – the LAC 
adopted the established test for unlisted grounds to give meaning to the word 
“arbitrary”
113
 (and here we have to bear in mind that section 6(1) was amended 
to bring it in line with section 187(1)(f) of the LRA). Fifthly, if one reads 
“arbitrary ground” in conjunction with the new section 11(2),
114
 it is clear that 
the irrationality of differentiation itself (as the flip-side of “arbitrary”) will 
not win a discrimination case based on an arbitrary ground. The complainant 
also has to show discrimination (which needs an identifiable ground) and 
unfairness.
115
 In this sense, arbitrariness/irrationality is clearly subjected 
to the established notions of discrimination and unfair discrimination, as it 
should be. While it is true that the provisions of section 11(1), which deals with 
discrimination on listed grounds, makes it clear that irrationality might “win” 
a discrimination claim, the section also makes it clear that discrimination (in 
the sense of direct or indirect differentiation on a listed ground) has to exist to 
begin with (before rationality is considered). Put differently, irrationality itself 
does not win cases for complainants, the irrationality of unfair discrimination 
111 
Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries 1999 20 ILJ 373 (LC) para 43. 
112 
SAMWU obo Nhlanhla / Hibiscus Coast Municipality 2016 7 BALR 751 (CCMA).
113 
See New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Marsland 2009 30 ILJ 2875 (LAC).
114 
Section 11 is quoted in the text to part 4 4 below.
115 
See, Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression 2016 37 ILJ 2872 (LC) para 53.
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(in its established meaning) does. Sixthly, constitutional jurisprudence has 
told us that the defence against a section 9(1) “differentiation” allegation is 
“rationality”. Rationality is a fairly easy argument to make and is about the 
link between means and ends – about whether conduct (the differentiation) 
furthers a legitimate purpose. Rationality is not the same as proportionality, 
which also looks at how important the goal is, its impact and whether there are 
better (or less invasive) ways to achieve that goal.
116
 Rationality does not mean 
what the court implied in Kadiaka. While the absence of a purpose would 
indeed constitute irrationality, rationality is not about the quality of a goal 
measured against the impact on the complainant as Kadiaka suggests. The 
Constitutional Court said the following about this in the context of section 
9(1) of the Constitution:
“Section 9(1) provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. The test for determining whether section 9(1) is violated was set out by the court 
in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Harksen v Lane. A law may differentiate between classes of persons 
if the differentiation is rationally linked to the achievement of a legitimate government purpose. The 
question is not whether the government could have achieved its purpose in a manner the court feels 
is better or more effective or more closely connected to that purpose. The question is whether the 
means the government chose are rationally connected to the purpose, as opposed to being arbitrary or 
capricious”
117
 (footnotes omitted).
Rationality and proportionality (which includes the importance of the goal 
measured against the impact on the complainant, as well as the question 
whether there were other less invasive ways to achieve the goal) are not the 
same. The irony, for those who want to elevate irrational differentiation in 
general (even without an accepted or acceptable ground) to discrimination, 
is the inherent danger of the argument. In those cases the allegation of 
discrimination is defeated simply by commercial reasons – all you need is a 
legitimate goal (which in the employment context would always be no more 
than a genuine, legitimate operational requirement or business need) and a 
showing that the differentiation furthers (is rationally linked to) this goal – 
much like substantive fairness in case of operational reasons dismissals, and 
much as happened in Mbana.
118
 There is no requirement of proportionality 
(and accommodation). And the further irony, of course, is that proportionality 
(which requires a goal to begin with and by necessary implication requires 
a link between the measure and the goal) embraces rationality. This means, 
to the extent that proportionality already is part and parcel of our “fairness” 
or “unfairness” of discrimination as illustrated above,
119
 there is no need 
to introduce rationality into the EEA, other than to expressly state what we 
already know (or to detract from the real protection of employees). Seventh, 
116 
See, for a general discussion on rationality in the context of section 9(1) of the Constitution, I Currie 
& J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 219 ff. Also note the distinction the authors make 
between section 9(1) rationality (based on differentiation between groups) and what they call general 
“rule of law” rationality (last-mentioned being premised on the general notion of arbitrariness, but limited 
to the exercise of public power). The EEA, of course, was expressly enacted in the context of, and to give 
effect to, section 9 of the Constitution. 
117 
Weare v Ndebele NO and Others 2009 1 SA 600 (CC) para 46.
118 
Hoffman v SA Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC).
119 
As discussed above in part 3.
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and by way of illustration, we can mention that a variety of potential unlisted 
or arbitrary “grounds” have come before the courts and the CCMA over the 
last few years – including “union membership”,
120
 “previous employer”,
121
 
“length of service”,
122
 “geographical location”,
123
 “successfully completing 
a test”,
124
 “being too professional”
125
 and “personal hygiene”.
126
 And it is 
easy to imagine others – for instance “precarious employment”, “criminal 
record”, “obesity”, “experience”, “height” or “weight”, “physical endurance”, 
“academic qualification” (or absence thereof), “where a qualification is 
obtained”, or “which sports team you support”. The question simply is this 
– how do we decide which of these grounds should be recognised as unlisted 
or “arbitrary grounds”? It is submitted that the only way to do so is to resort 
to the Harksen test. Not only for the reasons already mentioned, but for two 
further reasons illustrating the absurdity of a contrary view. Eighth, then, is 
the reality that many persons justifiably will feel that employees or prospective 
employees may well be prejudiced by, for example, decisions based on 
geographical location, experience, criminal record, or academic qualification. 
The fact remains that these grounds have a decided racial dimension in our 
country (and in many other countries, where they have formed the bases of 
indirect discrimination claims). Put differently, these grounds look neutral, 
but may well have a disproportionate racial effect. Similarly, a ground like 
physical endurance may seem sensible and neutral in certain contexts, but 
may have a decided gender effect. The point is this – section 6(1) of the EEA 
prohibits not only direct discrimination, but also indirect discrimination (that 
is, where a requirement looks neutral, but has a disproportionate effect). If 
we simply allow recognition of every ground not listed as “arbitrary”, the 
express prohibition of indirect discrimination in section 6(1) of the EEA 
becomes a dead letter (in its stead there will always be a case of direct 
discrimination on an unlisted or arbitrary ground). Lastly, as is evident from 
Kadiaka and the list of potential arbitrary grounds given above, the view that 
“arbitrary ground” means arbitrariness results in a curious conflation of the 
existence of discrimination and its fairness. To decide whether the employer 
acted arbitrarily (and discriminated) means we have to consider whether 
the employer acted fairly (with good reason). That simply is putting the cart 
before the horse. 
In short, the argument that arbitrary differentiation constitutes 
discrimination shows a clear disregard for Constitutional Court jurisprudence, 
the nature of discrimination, the wording of the EEA itself, LAC authority, 
120 
Safcor Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Safcor Panalpina v SA Freight and Dock Workers Union 2013 34 ILJ 335 
(LAC).
121 
Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries 1999 20 ILJ 373 (LC).
122 
See Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression 2016 37 ILJ 2872 (LC) and Ndlela / Philani 
Mega Spar 2016 37 ILJ 277 (CCMA).
123 
Duma v Minister of Correctional Services 2016 37 ILJ 1135 (LC).
124 
NEHAWU obo members / SARS 2015 9 BALR 966 (CCMA).
125 
Smith / Gauteng Provincial Legislature 2015 6 BALR 679 (CCMA).
126 
Gumede / Crimson Clover 17 (Pty) Ltd t/a Island Hotel 2016 7 BALR 676 (CCMA).
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Labour Court precedent,
127
 the rules of statutory interpretation, not to 
mention (semantic) common sense. Discrimination is about infringement of 
dignity (or a comparably serious harm), about an identifiable and unacceptable 
ground and about the link (directly or indirectly) between that ground and 
the differentiation. Should a ground not be listed, it should meet the well-
established test for unlisted grounds: it must have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of a person (or have a comparably serious effect) 
and has to show a relationship with the listed grounds.
128
 
Following on the decision in Pioneer Foods
129
 (where the court accepted that 
“arbitrary” means “unlisted” in its established sense), the Labour Court in 
Ndudula v Metrorail – PRASA (Western Cape)
130
 again considered this issue. 
With reference to Numsa v Gabriels (Pty) Ltd,
131
 constitutional developments 
and their legitimate impact on the interpretation of the EEA (as discussed 
above), the interpretation of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA in Marsland and its 
impact on interpretation of the EEA,
132
 the clear message sent by section 11 
of the EEA and also by placing Kadiaka
133
 in context, the court came to the 
conclusion (correctly, it is submitted) that:
“The crux of the test for unfair discrimination is the impairment of human dignity or an adverse effect 
in a comparably similar manner, not the classification of the ground as listed or unlisted as is evident 
from the quotation from Harksen. … Differentiation on both a listed and analogous ground amounts 
to unfair discrimination only if the differentiation has indeed affected human dignity or has had an 
adverse effect in a similar serious consequence … the purpose of adding “or any other arbitrary 
ground” to section 6 was not to create a third category of unfair discrimination as contended for by the 
applicants in this matter …. The purpose of the legislator by inserting “or any other arbitrary ground” 
serves no other purpose than being synonymous with “one or more ground” or being synonymous 
with “unlisted grounds”.”
134
Recently, in Chitsinde v Sol Plaatje University (“Sol Plaatje”),
135
 the 
Labour Court was once again called on to consider discrimination on an 
alleged arbitrary ground (a so-called “aptitude test” or written submission 
not required from the applicant’s competitors for employment). In a curious 
judgment (handed down by the same judge who decided Pioneer Foods, 
but in apparent contradiction to that earlier judgment), the court expressed 
127 
In Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression 2016 37 ILJ 2872 (LC) the Labour Court 
accepted the Harksen test for unlisted or “arbitrary” grounds. See paras 22, 32, 55, 56 of the judgment.
128 
See the discussion in the text to part 3 1 2 above.
129 
See the text to n 101 above.
130 2017 38 ILJ 2565 (LC)
131 2002 23 ILJ 2088 (LC).
132 
See the text to part 3 1 2 above. 
133 
See the text to part 3 1 2 above.
134 
Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries 1999 20 ILJ 373 (LC) paras 73, 101,102 (footnotes omitted).
135 Case No 482/15 of 29-06-2018. 
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its agreement with the contradictory
136
 views of Du Toit et al,
137
 which we 
submit, for all of the reasons mentioned above, are wrong and nonsensical 
in light of the express wording of section 11(2) of the EEA. One interesting 
aspect of this judgment was the argument raised by the applicant that his 
non-appointment infringed his dignity. The court in Sol Plaatje dealt with 
this by first accepting the link between productive work and dignity, but 
then rejecting the argument by distinguishing the authority relied on by the 
applicant and stating that there is no right to be appointed. What makes this 
argument interesting is that it perhaps gives us a clue as to the fundamental 
motivation of proponents of the view that “arbitrary” in section 6(1) of the 
EEA should mean “arbitrariness” independent of dignity: employment simply 
is so important (especially in South Africa) that there should be a general right 
to rationality in the employment sphere. That arguably may be so – but that is 
an argument for a different time and a different place. Our argument simply 
is that in the broader context of all the protection available to employees in 
terms of carefully tailored labour legislation, the EEA is not the place for 
this to happen. That Act – the way it is written and the way in which it has 
been interpreted and applied – is aimed at the specific mischief of unfair 
discrimination which has been ascribed a specific meaning. What Sol Plaatje 
does clearly show is, firstly, that there is no escaping the wording of the new 
onus provision (discussed below) in section 11(2) of the EEA where applicants 
rely on so-called “arbitrary grounds: the applicant has to prove irrationality 
(arbitrariness) and discrimination and unfairness. Secondly, these types of 
discrimination cases may (and often will) fail at the first of these three hurdles 
(the employer only has to show commercial rationality). Again, according to 
the clear wording of section 11(2), the rationality of an employer’s conduct 
defeats a discrimination case based on an arbitrary ground, but irrationality 
on its own does not win such a case. Our argument simply is that, while the 
applicant in Sol Plaatje did identify a ground (the aptitude test), discrimination 
cases such as these should be dismissed unless the applicant, as a threshold 
requirement, can also show that the ground is worthy of recognition in terms 
136 
The apparent contradiction of the view of Du Toit et al on which the court relied – quoted in n 137 below 
– is reliance on dignity as a fundamental principle of discrimination law to eliminate the possibility of 
commercial reasons trumping protection against discrimination, but then rejecting dignity to cast the net 
of “arbitrary grounds” as wide as possible. Also see the remarks further in the text.
137 
The passage relied on is the following from D du Toit Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 
6 ed (2015) 683: “Other” may be read as suggesting that the defining characteristic of all prohibited 
grounds, including listed grounds, is henceforth to be characterised as “arbitrary”. Such a reversion to 
the framework of Schedule 7 to the LRA, however, is excluded by the fundamental principle that it is 
not “lack of reason” but violation of human dignity that forms the essence of “unfairness” in all forms 
of discrimination proscribed by the Constitution and, hence, by the EEA. Thus, in terms of Schedule 
7, demonstrating that an employer’s conduct was not “purposeless” but was motivated by commercial 
rationale was potentially a good defence against a claim of unfair discrimination. In the context of the 
EEA it is evident that a “commercial reason” in itself, of whatever magnitude, can never outweigh the 
fundamental right to dignity. By the same token, the reintroduction of the prohibition of discrimination 
on “arbitrary” grounds cannot be understood as merely reiterating the existence of unlisted grounds, 
which would render it redundant. To avoid redundancy, “arbitrary” must add something to the meaning 
of “unfair discrimination”. Giving it the meaning ascribed to it by Landman J in Kadiaka – that is, 
“capricious” or for no good reason – would broaden the scope of the prohibition of discrimination from 
grounds that undermine human dignity to include grounds that are merely irrational without confining it 
to the latter.” 
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of the Harksen test (which was not the case in Sol Plaatje, nor in Pioneer 
Foods in respect of length of service). 
4 4  The structure of unfair discrimination – the new onus provision
Proper appreciation of the amended onus provision has at least two 
dimensions: First, its potential contribution in a transformative context; 
secondly, what it actually means, and what it tells us, if anything, about the 
structure and our understanding of “unfair discrimination”. The essence of 
the new section 11 is that the full onus of persuasion – in respect of both the 
presence or otherwise of discrimination as well as rationality and fairness 
or justification (if discrimination exists) – now rests on the employer where 
a case is based on a listed ground. In contrast, the full onus of persuasion 
remains on the employee in case of an arbitrary (unlisted) ground. 
As mentioned earlier, experience has shown that most discrimination cases 
are lost at the discrimination stage (not on fairness or justification) for two 
reasons. First, “discrimination” already requires a valid comparison (in most 
cases), the identification of a ground of discrimination and the applicability of 
that ground to the facts at hand, as well as a sufficient link (causation) between the 
ground and the conduct complained of. In addition, in a case of discrimination 
on an unlisted or arbitrary ground, the case has to be made that the ground is 
worthy of recognition in terms of the applicable test. Put differently, there are 
a whole host of potential hurdles in getting from the conduct complained of to 
the point where we can say discrimination (in the legal sense) exists. If any one 
of these elements is missing, the claim fails. Secondly, closely related, there 
are the evidentiary problems associated with proof of discrimination claims. 
In cases of direct discrimination, the fundamental difficulty has always been 
that evidence to bolster comparison with other employees, as well as the 
reasons for the employer’s conduct, remain in the domain of the employer and 
is not readily available to complainants. This in turn means that complainants 
often have to rely on evidence which by its very nature is circumstantial 
and weak. Not surprisingly, many direct discrimination claims in the past 
– with the onus being on the employee to prove “discrimination” – never 
progressed beyond a mere allegation of discrimination. In case of indirect 
discrimination claims, evidentiary problems also exist. Sometimes (the easy 
indirect discrimination cases), the disproportionate impact on a protected 
group of a seemingly neutral requirement or condition is readily evident and 
a matter of common sense.
138
 But often the evidence (or the raw statistics) 
about the impact of workplace policies or practices will fall in the domain 
of the employer, or will only be available through statistical impact analyses 
requiring varying degrees of sophistication. For indirect discrimination cases, 
data, which is not always available or reliable, is needed. The bold step to 
place an onus of persuasion on the employer – also in relation to the presence 
or absence of discrimination – should go a long way to ensure that evidentiary 
138 
See, eg, Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 285 
(LC).
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issues are canvassed fully and properly. At the same time, there is the danger 
that the floodgates of discriminatory allegations based on vague notions of 
unfairness, or poorly identified or merely incidental grounds will require a 
disproportionate allocation of CCMA resources. Earlier, suggestions were 
made as to how the CCMA may sensibly cope with this; the most important 
of which, perhaps, is a sound knowledge of discrimination law and the 
concomitant capacity to identify and weed out weak cases at an early stage. 
The second issue that arises around the onus provision concerns the meaning 
of section 11 and what it tells us about the structure of our discrimination law. 
It is worthwhile to quote the provision in full:
“11. Burden of proof
(1) If unfair discrimination is alleged on a ground listed in section 6(1), the employer against whom 
the allegation is made must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that such discrimination —
(a) did not take place as alleged; or
(b) is rational and not unfair, or is otherwise justifiable.
(2) If unfair discrimination is alleged on an arbitrary ground, the complainant must prove, on a 
balance of probabilities, that —
(a) the conduct complained of is not rational;
(b) the conduct complained of amounts to discrimination; and
(c) the discrimination is unfair.”
An initial reading of section 11(1) as it relates to cases based on listed 
grounds already raises a number of issues. First, section 11(1) makes a 
clear distinction between the idea of discrimination, the idea of unfair 
discrimination and the idea of the justification of unfair discrimination. As 
such, the provision seemingly (and closely) follows the Constitution and the 
structure of unfair discrimination established by the Constitutional Court 
in Harksen. Secondly, in case of listed grounds, the full onus of persuasion 
(also about the absence of discrimination) is now on the employer which, it is 
submitted, is not problematic, even in light of section 9(5) of the Constitution. 
On a first reading then, but also considering the case law discussed earlier, it 
seems easy to give the following (sequential) construction to section 11 where 
discrimination is based on a listed ground: 
• a proper allegation of unfair discrimination by the complainant;139
• followed by the opportunity of the employer to show the absence of 
discrimination (which could be any one or more of an invalid comparison, 
the inapplicability of the ground of discrimination, or the absence of the 
required link between the differentiation and the alleged ground);
• if the employer cannot disprove the allegation of the existence of 
discrimination, there is the opportunity to show – as a general and in 
principle unlimited opportunity – that the discrimination is “rational and 
not unfair, or is otherwise justifiable”; 
• if the employer chooses to rely on affirmative action consistent with the 
purpose of the EEA, or an inherent requirement of a job and is successful, 
it would constitute a complete defence against the allegation of unfair 
discrimination. 
139 
As to what this means, see the discussion in the text to part 4 2 above.
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Having said this, Du Toit
140
 has endeavoured to ascribe a different meaning 
to section 11. His view, if we understand it correctly, is that the words “such 
discrimination” in section 11(1) refer only to the “alleged discrimination” 
mentioned in the introduction to that section, that section 11 deals with proof 
after the allegation and, presumably, that this then means that paragraphs 
(a) and (b) (especially (b) which allows for fair or justifiable discrimination) 
relates only to the “allegation”, and not the “actual discrimination”. This, in 
turn, creates room for the argument that there is no question about fairness or 
justifiability of discrimination on a listed ground, rather a question only about 
the presence or absence of discrimination. In support of this construction, Du 
Toit relies on the much maligned judgment of Willis JA in Woolworths (Pty) 
Ltd v Whitehead (“Whitehead”)
141
 to illustrate the dangers of an open-ended 
defence of fairness, the argument that Harksen is about the constitutionality 
of legislation (and inapplicable in the employment context), constitutional 
avoidance, as well as the dictates of ILO Convention 111 and the role it should 
play in the South African context.
142
Most of these arguments have already been addressed in the course of 
this article. At the risk of repetition, the following may be said: First, Du 
Toit’s proposed interpretation of section 11 seems inconsistent with its clear 
wording. Secondly, it is clear that the Constitutional Court and all other courts 
have applied Harksen – and continue to do so – also in the context of employer 
conduct and have shown themselves to be quite comfortable with the idea of 
fair discrimination.
143
 Thirdly, the principle of constitutional avoidance does 
not mean the Constitution plays no role in the interpretation of legislation 
giving effect to the Constitution (as the EEA does). On the contrary – the less 
legislation says (and the EEA did not and does not say much about “unfair 
discrimination”), the greater the role of the Constitution.
144
 And, with the 
amendment of section 11, the EEA has arguably expressly been brought 
in line with the Constitution and the past two decades of jurisprudence. 
ILO Convention 111 was also dealt with earlier. The EEA prohibits unfair 
discrimination and allows for “special measures” (affirmative action) and an 
inherent requirement of a job as complete defences to discrimination claims. 
In this sense, the EEA is compliant with ILO Convention 111. The only 
complaint could be that the EEA – by consistently using the word “unfair” 
and calling for the word to be taken seriously – allows for more than the 
Convention. But it was shown earlier that the definition of discrimination in 
the Convention itself arguably allows for a nuanced approach to acceptable and 
unacceptable discrimination
145
 and that our chosen route – that of fairness or 
unfairness – actually adds value to discrimination law. The so-called dangers 
of “general fairness” are also more apparent than real. One arguably aberrant 
judgment (Whitehead) does not detract from the validity of the broader 
140 
Du Toit (2014) ILJ 2623.
141 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 2000 21 ILJ 571 (LAC) paras 129-149.
142 
Du Toit (2014) ILJ 2632-2636.
143 
See the discussion in the text to part 3 above and the cases referred to there.
144 
See the discussion in the text to part 2 above.
145 
See the discussion in the text to part 2 above.
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argument. Further, if we take rationality and fairness together (in the sense 
of section 11) and read it against the backdrop of our jurisprudence, there are 
clear and strict guiding principles for the application of this general defence. 
We know fairness primarily is about the impact on the complainant (dignity) 
and that the legitimacy of the goal and the relationship between the measure 
and the goal are important (through rationality). It was also illustrated that 
proportionality is included in the way our courts approach the “fairness” of 
discrimination and that this includes a consideration of how important the 
goal is, measuring the goal against its impact, as well as a consideration of 
less invasive ways to achieve the goal. Under “less invasive ways” we can 
include the idea of reasonable accommodation, a principle clearly accepted by 
our Constitutional Court in the context of discrimination.
146
 Put differently – 
before an employer will be successful in showing rationality and fairness (in 
the general section 11(1) sense of the phrase) – the employer will have to clear 
the hurdles of dignity, rationality and proportionality (inclusive of reasonable 
accommodation). Clearly this will be difficult, and it should be. But the fact that 
more often than not employers will fail, does not mean that the possibility does 
not or should not exist – especially if we take the Constitution, constitutional 
jurisprudence, other precedent and the clear wording of the EEA seriously.
147
 
As mentioned – if one simply combines the different policies and practices 
envisaged by the EEA (let alone the myriad more specific requirements and 
conditions in any workplace underlying those policies and practices) with the 
20 listed grounds, we start off with the possibility of 240 different types of 
discrimination claims. Can we really say, in advance, that a proper application 
of dignity, rationality, proportionality and individual accommodation might 
not show a defence for an employer or might lead to an irresponsible dilution 
of protection against discrimination? 
One example of how this defence – which will typically only be available 
where the employer seeks to promote diversity – could work is to be found in 
Davids/ Peninsula Beverage Co (Pty) Ltd.
148
 In this case, the employer had 
a long standing practice that allowed its Muslim (17% of the workforce) and 
Hindu (1% of the workforce) employees to apply for special leave for Eid and 
Diwali (only these days), which do not always fall on workdays. The employer 
was approached by one of its shop stewards, self-styled as a devout Christian, 
who applied for special leave on the Day of Ascension in 2015. The application 
was denied, and the shop steward was told to use annual leave (which he 
did). After this, an internal decision involving employee representatives was 
taken to keep the policy in place. The shop steward referred a case of religious 
discrimination to the CCMA. The employer’s stated goal was to accommodate 
religious diversity, based on the fact that the Christian faith was already 
“catered” for through two public holidays – Good Friday and Christmas day. 
This argument by the employer clearly had nothing to do with the inherent 
146 
See MEC For Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 71 ff. 
147 
To this may be added the persuasive influence of comparative law and analogous legislation – notably 
section 14 of PEPUDA. See the discussion in Garbers “The prohibition of discrimination in employment: 
Performance and prognosis in a transformative context” in Labour Law into the Future 33 ff.
148 CCMA case WECT 9800-2015 of 1 October 2015.
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requirement of a job, nor affirmative action. The commissioner – in applying 
Leonard Dingler
149
 – found that the employer did discriminate, but that it was 
rational and not unfair: according to the commissioner the employer had a 
legitimate goal and acted rationally and proportionally.
150
 
As mentioned, this approach addresses the criticism that discrimination 
– as a matter of South African law – can never be “fair”. It also addresses 
any attempted construction of section 11 of the EEA (and, by implication, 
the structure of unfair discrimination) based on this view. But, as pointed out 
earlier, it also addresses the related argument that fairness is too amorphous 
a concept to use as a yardstick to limit discrimination. In South Africa, the 
possibility of fair discrimination is not amorphous – it is founded on well-
established and recognised concepts, which include proportionality. In any 
event, it has to be said that the idea that labour lawyers (or any lawyer, for that 
matter) should express unease with fairness as a legal concept or yardstick 
is rather strange. Fairness may always start life as an indeterminate concept, 
but is always given or acquires a specific meaning in a specific context – it is 
either predetermined in legislation, or acquires meaning through litigation and 
precedent. This is exactly what has happened over the last two decades – fairness 
in the discrimination context is, and should be, determined with reference to 
dignity, rationality, proportionality and individual accommodation. The mere 
fact that all these considerations serve to define “fairness” in the sphere of 
discrimination shows a clearly circumscribed and very stringent test for the 
fairness of discrimination.
It is submitted that section 11 means exactly what it says – and that is the 
meaning we ascribe to it above. First, employers may defeat discrimination 
claims by showing the absence of discrimination. If this is not possible, 
employers may attempt to show the discrimination is rational and not unfair, 
or otherwise justifiable, taking into consideration the four guiding principles 
mentioned above. 
What the phrase “otherwise justifiable” in section 11(1) means is not entirely 
clear. It may mean justification in the section 36 Constitutional sense,151 but 
then, as discussed above, “justification” (that is, proportionality) is already 
part of fairness. It may be a deliberate effort to split fairness and justification 
(proportionality), or to create room for proportionality to be a self- standing 
test (apart from fairness). It may also mean justification in the section 6(2) 
EEA sense – that is, where the employer relies on affirmative action or the 
inherent requirement of a job and these are seen as complete defences to 
allegations of unfair discrimination. As far as the inherent requirement of a 
job is concerned, the SCA recently was quite comfortable to view this defence 
as justification for unfair discrimination.152 
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Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 285 (LC).
150 
It should perhaps be mentioned that even though public holidays may be exchanged, it could never work 
if the remaining 82% of employees do not come to work.
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This section is quoted in the text to n 35 above.
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Department of Correctional Services v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 2013 34 ILJ 1375 (SCA). 
The contrary view that discrimination may not be justified expressed by the LAC in Jansen van Vuuren 
was based on the previous wording of section 11 of the EEA which did not mention justification.
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But, as far as affirmative action is concerned, there is a strong argument that 
affirmative action should not be seen as discrimination to begin with. That 
argument is, in effect, based on the constitutional presumption of unfairness 
of discrimination on listed grounds. In other words, the stronger argument is 
not that affirmative action is not discrimination (in the sense of an exclusion 
or preference based on race or gender), but that it is not presumptively unfair 
discrimination. This argument has, in any event, now been overtaken in 
the employment context by the full onus being on employers – to show the 
absence of discrimination or its fairness or justification. Presumption or 
no presumption – the employer must show (in the face of an allegation of 
unfair discrimination arising from affirmative action) that its conduct “was 
consistent with the purpose of the Act”. “Otherwise justifiable” may also 
mean something else – for example, justification in the section 7 EEA153 sense 
of the word or as provided for by Regulation 7 in respect of “equal pay” (that 
is, something other than proportionality or the section 6(2) EEA defences). 
It may also mean more or all of the above. The courts will have to provide 
clarity on this. In doing so, it is as well to remind ourselves that the word 
“justification” in its ordinary sense means “vindication” or “exculpation” – in 
other words, while it may have seemed as if there was something wrong, there 
is nothing wrong with what you did to begin with. 
As a last thought, note should be taken of one curiosity arising from the equal 
pay regulations. Regulation 7 – headed “Factors justifying differentiation in 
terms and conditions of employment” – provides that a difference in terms and 
conditions of employment is not unfair discrimination if it is “fair and rational 
and is based on” one or more of seven reasons mentioned in the regulation. The 
first problem with this regulation is that it is seemingly not in line with section 
11 of the EEA (which only requires rationality and fairness, not something 
more, to defeat discrimination claims). Furthermore, regulation 7(2) tells us 
what is “rational and not unfair” in the area of equal pay: the differentiation 
must not be biased against a group on any listed ground and it must be applied 
in a proportionate manner. 
Above all, what we have to bear in mind is that the controlling equal pay 
provision in section 6(4) of the EEA does not prohibit a differentiation in pay. 
It declares differentiation on the grounds listed in section 6(1) of the EEA to 
be unfair discrimination. The rules and principles arising from this reality 
and discussed throughout this article apply with equal force. And, if anything, 
the principles relating to equal pay cases (as recognised in the Regulations) 
serve as a constant reminder of two things: first, that discrimination may be 
shown to be fair or justified for reasons other than the two defences expressly 
mentioned in the EEA – an inherent requirement of a job or affirmative action; 
and that the cornerstone of fairness is an absence of bias and proportionality 
(as discussed throughout this article). And, at the same time, the wording of 
the regulations shows that we should not be too pedantic about the distinction 
between fairness and justification. 
153 
Section 7(1(b) of the EEA provides for “justification” of medical testing. 
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5  Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to investigate the conceptual foundation 
of our employment discrimination law, how the amendments to the EEA 
affected it and how we can expect our law to develop into the future, especially 
considering the increased role of the CCMA. What is clear from this review 
is that at the heart of the conceptual challenge is the meaning of “unfair 
discrimination” (inclusive of the meaning of the grounds of discrimination). 
What the review also shows is that focus is often lost in semantics. Words 
like arbitrary, fairness, justification, rationality, proportionality and the 
like are used too often and too loose and fast. A careful analysis, however, 
shows that this is all much ado about a few basic and clear principles. First, 
the idea of the “fairness” or otherwise of discrimination does not violate 
ILO Convention 111 and is in line with the Constitution and constitutional 
jurisprudence, as it should be. Secondly, the “fairness” of discrimination is 
not completely open-ended – in essence it consists of dignity, rationality, 
proportionality and accommodation (which is actually part and parcel of 
proportionality), principles we all accept as precondition for the limitation of 
protection against discrimination. Thirdly, the EEA is about discrimination, 
not about differentiation. Discrimination always requires an identifiable 
and unacceptable ground. And if the ground is not specifically listed, we 
should recognise and respect the nature of discrimination by insisting that 
that ground has the potential – as do the listed grounds – to impact on the 
dignity of the complainant. Fourthly, despite capacity challenges (and some 
proposals to address this were made in this article), the increased jurisdiction 
of the CCMA has given discrimination litigation (as the basis for promotion 
of equality and transformation) a decided impetus. 
In final conclusion it may well be said that there exists greater clarity 
about our employment discrimination law than many would think, that the 
amendments to a large extent confirm this clarity and, to the extent that some 
still maintain otherwise, we are probably talking semantics, not substance. 
SUMMARY
Important amendments to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (“EEA”) were introduced in 
2014, notably conferring jurisdiction on the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
in employment discrimination cases, inserting the phrase ‘arbitrary ground’ in section 6(1)  of 
the EEA, explicitly providing for (and proscribing) unfair discrimination in terms and conditions 
of employment and also including a brand new onus provision in section 11. In this contribution, 
the impact of these amendments on our conceptual understanding of employment discrimination 
law is considered in the context of: First, world-wide trends in the development of employment 
discrimination law and the South African adoption of employment discrimination law in line with 
those trends; secondly, the correct approach to interpretation of the EEA in light of ILO Convention 
111 and the Constitution,1996; thirdly, the judicial development of principles applicable to employment 
discrimination over the past 25 years, which precedent provides a lot of certainty about the conceptual 
foundations of our employment discrimination law; and, fourthly, the initial academic views, 
experiences and judicial approaches after the amendments came into effect. Ultimately, the authors 
argue that these amendments do not signify, nor do they require, any significant departure from the 
pre-amendment conceptual approach to employment discrimination established through precedent 
over the past 25 years.
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